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ERIK J. DAHL
The Localization of Intelligence: A New
Direction for American Federalism
Intelligence has been historically seen as a national-level function, carried out
primarily by the federal government. Although local law enforcement
agencies have often conducted intelligence activities, these have usually
focused on criminal prosecution, leaving to the national level the task of
using intelligence to proactively counter national security threats. The U.S.
Intelligence Community, for an example, is an exclusively federal-level entity,
and the literature on American intelligence tends to focus on national-level
organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.1 Since the 11 September 2001 (9/11)
attacks, however, there has been significant effort in the United States to
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share intelligence with state and local officials, and to a lesser extent, to
create new local intelligence structures and organizations. This has resulted in
what might be called the “localization of intelligence,”2 and although civil
liberties advocates worry about the possible erosion of liberty and privacy
that such efforts may produce, many scholars and law enforcement experts
argue that this increased focus on local intelligence has been a positive
development. Little research has been done, however, to examine the results
of such local intelligence programs.
The localization of intelligence is important for American government
beyond its immediate impact on counterterrorism or law enforcement.
Because it has increased the role of state and local government in areas that
have traditionally been dominated by the federal government, it presents a
challenge to the American system of federalism. Who should make decisions
about the collection and analysis of intelligence on Americans? What should
be the “lanes in the road” for federal, state, and local agencies in the area of
domestic intelligence? In the past, such questions would have been easy to
answer: most of the national intelligence community has traditionally focused
on foreign intelligence, while the FBI handled domestic issues. But today the
answers are not so clear.
The challenge to the American system of federalism presented by the
localization of intelligence resembles a larger challenge raised by the increased
focus on homeland security in the United States after the 9/11 attacks. As
Donald F. Kettl writes, homeland security placed new demands on our
system of federalism, requiring greater coordination among all levels of
government: “Perhaps no other issue in U.S. history has so sharply raised a
question about the role and structure of federalism.”3 The requirements to
provide for additional homeland security, including greater efforts toward
counterterrorism and domestic intelligence, produced conflicting pressures for
American federalism. On the one hand, the initial impulse in all these areas
was to centralize and increase the authority of the federal government. But,
on the other hand, because the nature of the terrorist threat called for a large
law enforcement response, and because policing in America is largely a state
and local responsibility, there was pressure for an increasing role by local
governments.4
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was concern in the
United States that the government response would require so much
centralization that it might harm or even “kill” federalism.5 The same
concerns arose again after Hurricane Katrina,6 and more recently scholars
have argued that the swing in the pendulum of federal power has moved
firmly in the direction of greater central control.7 This centralization and
expansion of federal government control has been seen as especially
significant for intelligence, creating what Dana Priest and William M. Arkin
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termed “A Top Secret America hidden from public view and lacking in
thorough oversight.”8
But not all scholars agree that American federalism has been
weakened in recent years by an over-powerful federal government.
Matthew Kroenig and Jay Stowsky argue that “To a surprising extent,
initiatives to counter the terrorist threat by expanding the state’s
domestic powers have been resisted, restrained, and even rejected
outright.”9 One example of this phenomenon they point to is the case
of domestic intelligence; proposals after 9/11 called for a new domestic
intelligence agency that would have “the potential for a clear increase
in state power,” but such proposals were rejected.10 The state (i.e., the
federal government) did gain some increased capability for domestic
intelligence, they argue, but this increase was restrained, and the
authority for domestic intelligence remained with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), where it had been before 9/11. Kettl makes a
similar argument that “In the Cold War, the federal government drove
national security. The age of terror turned that on its head, with local
governments on the front lines.”11
Intelligence is one important area where local governments have been, to
use Kettl’s imagery, on the front lines since 9/11. This article extends the
arguments made by Kettl and by Kroenig and Stowsky, noting that the
localization of intelligence has had the effect of reducing the central
government’s authority over intelligence and bringing this important function
of government closer to the people it serves.
This article makes two arguments: First, that the localization of
intelligence in the United States represents a significant but understudied shift
in American federalism; and, second, that despite important civil liberties
concerns, state and local intelligence programs are in many cases more
appropriate tools for counterterrorism and other homeland security functions
than are national-level efforts.
The next section describes the localization of intelligence in the United
States today. The subsequent section reviews the literature on federalism and
law enforcement to develop two arguments why local intelligence programs
might be preferable to national-level efforts: they are more effective, and they
are more responsive to local norms and preferences and thus more acceptable
to the communities they serve. These arguments are then tested through an
examination of two types of local intelligence programs that have become
common since 9/11: state and local intelligence fusion centers, and local
“domain awareness programs” that bring together a wide range of
intelligence and surveillance information. The article concludes by arguing
that the localization of intelligence has been an important but under-
recognized trend in American government, which deserves greater attention.
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THE LOCALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
Until recently, any discussion of intelligence in the United States typically
centered on federal government agencies and capabilities. Although before
the 9/11 attacks many state and local law enforcement agencies had
intelligence units, these usually focused on responding to crime, rather than
the prevention of future actions. David L. Carter writes that criminal
intelligence units “tended to be reactive in nature, often viewed as a
repository of sensitive information rather than a proactive resource that
could produce information critical for preventing crime and apprehending
offenders.”12 For example, before 9/11, the New York City Police
Department (NYPD)’s Intelligence Division was primarily intended to
protect dignitaries and produce criminal intelligence.13
This division of responsibilities, with most intelligence functions held at the
national level, served America’s national security needs during the Cold War.
But it was considered less appropriate for ensuring homeland security in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, as the need for domestic intelligence grew
swiftly. Domestic intelligence, however, presents organizational and
jurisdictional challenges that are not normally seen with traditional foreign
intelligence. Stephen Marrin writes:
Unlike foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence in the US involves
governing authorities at different, and sometimes overlapping,
jurisdictions… . For example, preventing terrorist attacks in New
York City could be seen as the responsibility of the federal
government, the New York State government and its Office of
Counter Terrorism, or the New York City government and its New
York City Police Department’s Counter Terrorism Division.14
Much of the focus of U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 was to increase
centralization and oversight, especially through the creation of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism
Center. There was, however, also a concerted effort to encourage federal
intelligence agencies to share information at the state and local levels. The
White House National Strategy for Information Sharing, published in 2007,
declared that state, local, and tribal governments “must have access to the
information that enables them to protect our local communities.”15 And the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence called for “moving beyond
considering State and local government to be only ‘first responders,’
preferring instead to thinking of them as the first line of defense in a very
deep line of information assets.”16
Much of the literature on domestic and homeland security intelligence
efforts has called for increased coordination among all levels of government,
and in particular for greater information sharing and support for states and
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local communities by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
other federal agencies.17 These calls have led to a number of efforts aimed at
increased information sharing, including the establishment of what is known
as an Information Sharing Environment that promotes federal, state,
local, tribal, and private sector partnerships.18 Local participation in
counterterrorism efforts has grown dramatically, especially through the
expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), which are FBI-led
organizations that involve federal, state, and local agencies.19 The number of
JTTFs has expanded from 35 in 2001 to 104 today.20
At the same time, although less widely noted than these information-
sharing measures, there has been an effort to devolve more intelligence
responsibility to the state and local levels. A number of scholars have
supported this move; only a year after the 9/11 attacks, for example, Stephen
Sloan called for “the localization of counterterrorism intelligence.”21 Today,
many experts would argue that such localized intelligence now exists.
Matthew C. Waxman, for example, has described the increasing role played
by local officials in domestic intelligence:
If an individual is being watched as a potential terrorism threat
because of his appearance, it may be a local officer watching. If a
government agent is looking around a mosque and asking questions of
members, it may be a local cop. If data are being mined for suspicious
patterns, local officials may have collected and passed on some of
that data.22
The most prominent feature of the localization of intelligence may be the
establishment of a network of state and local intelligence fusion centers,
which are under local control even though they typically receive federal
funding and support. Former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano called
fusion centers “the centerpiece of state, local, [and] federal intelligence-
sharing,”23 and criminal justice scholars argue that these centers are
important for the prevention of terrorism.24 An early version of a local
counterterrorism fusion center was established in Los Angeles in 1996,25
but the current national network was established beginning in the years
immediately following 9/11, with support from DHS and the Department
of Justice. Today there are 80 centers, with at least one fusion center in
every state and the District of Columbia as well as in Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.26
Another major aspect of localized intelligence is the increasing use by state
and local law enforcement since the 9/11 attacks of what is often called
“intelligence-led policing.” The primary impetus for the use of intelligence
tools and techniques has been counterterrorism,27 and the NYPD is well
known for having the most extensive counterterrorism intelligence effort in
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American law enforcement.28 But many other departments, both large and
small, have also embraced an intelligence-led policing model for addressing
other types of crime as well as terrorism.29
In recent years state and local authorities have made increasingly
widespread use of intelligence and surveillance technologies, such as public
surveillance cameras. For example, New Orleans, Louisiana, considered a
plan in 2017 to create a network of 1,500 video cameras that would be “one
of the most extensive video-monitoring systems for any midsize American
city.”30 And Chicago, which has suffered from high violent crime rates in
recent years, is investing in technology to link some 30,000 video cameras in
an effort to more quickly respond to and even prevent crime.31 In addition to
traditional surveillance cameras, local police departments are beginning to
use overhead surveillance systems, such as high-tech cameras mounted on
small aircraft that offer authorities the ability to watch large areas for long
periods of time.32
License plate reader (LPR) systems are another increasingly common
surveillance tool for local law enforcement. The NYPD has been collecting
LPR data since 2007, when it began installing readers as part of its Lower
Manhattan Security Initiative. More recently it has been expanding its
program to be able to receive notifications when the license plate of a New
York City suspect is detected in other cities across the country.33 Hundreds
of law enforcement agencies across the country use LPR systems, and their
use is not limited to large, metropolitan police departments. The town of
Tiburon, California, for example, has LPRs recording every car that comes
into town.34
Beyond these relatively familiar technologies, local agencies are also using
newer tools, such as cell phone tower simulators that can trick cellphones into
reporting their unique identifier information. The NYPD, for example, used
this technology more than 1,000 times between 2008 and 2016, according to
data obtained by the New York Civil Liberties Union.35 Facial recognition is
another newer technology that is being used more often. Modern facial
recognition technology can use software to identify 16,000 points on a
person’s face and compare them with photos of suspected criminals or
terrorists at a rate of more than one million images per second. Some
communities, such as Boston, have decided against using the technology;
Boston Police Commissioner William B. Evans said, “I don’t want people to
think we’re always spying on them.”36 But a number of cities are using facial
recognition technology, including New York, Chicago, and San Diego, and
Amazon recently began marketing its own technology, called Rekognition, to
law enforcement agencies.37 And thousands of local law enforcement agencies
may have access to facial recognition data, together with other information,
through the FBI’s Next Generation Identification program.38
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Local authorities are also using unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, for
surveillance. One of the earliest users of drones for domestic surveillances was
the Texas Department of Public Safety, which has used the technology to
assist in high-risk operations since at least 2009.39 Some communities, such as
Seattle, have decided against the use of drones for law enforcement, citing
civil liberties concerns, but a number of local agencies have received Federal
Aviation Authority Certificates of Authorization to fly unmanned aircraft,
and it is expected that their use will increase.40
A number of police departments use data mining and big data analytics to
attempt to understand future threats. These tools are often used for what is
called “predictive policing,” an increasingly popular concept in American law
enforcement in which data are analyzed using computer algorithms to
forecast the likelihood of future crimes.41 Many departments also use
advanced analytical software from companies such as Palantir, which until
recently was only available to the federal government.42 The Chicago Police
Department, for example, uses data such as criminal records, gang
connections, and social networks to develop a “heat list” of people who are
considered more likely to be involved in violent crime.43 And at least one
private company offers police software that can scan vast amounts of data
and provide officers a green, yellow, or red threat rating on an individual or
a location.44
Social media aggregator systems from companies such as Geofeedia have
collected public posts from Facebook, Twitter, and other sites, and made the
data available to law enforcement agencies. This technique has been labeled
Social Media Intelligence,45 and has led to charges that authorities may use it
to conduct surveillance of minorities or others exercising their right of free
speech.46 But after five people were killed in a shooting at the office of a
newspaper in Annapolis, Maryland, in June 2018, some observers
commented that the killings could have been prevented if police had been
able to use such tools to track the gunman’s online postings.47
Cities often link many of these surveillance tools to create what are
sometimes called “domain awareness systems,” designed to provide
authorities with real-time surveillance capabilities to combat terrorism and
solve crimes. Often these programs are part of broader efforts to link a wide
variety of systems to improve the quality of community life through “smart
cities.” The term “domain awareness” has been used for some time by
military forces seeking to understand their environment,48 and after 9/11 it
began to be used in a local homeland security context as well. Some of these
programs are modeled partly on New York City’s system, and while they are
often controversial, they have become popular among law enforcement and
community leaders.49
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WHY WOULD LOCAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS BE BETTER?
Although many experts argue that the expansion of local intelligence efforts
following the 9/11 attacks has been a good thing, these programs also come
under frequent criticism, often from civil rights advocates. Nonetheless, there
has been relatively little research conducted to examine the value of local
intelligence programs. This section first briefly reviews the objections of
critics and then examines the literature on federalism and law enforcement to
develop two arguments for why local programs should have advantages
over national programs. Those arguments will then be tested in the
subsequent section.
Critics of Local Intelligence Programs
Some observers argue that state and local intelligence programs present a
problem in that they are less closely regulated than federal-level programs
and agencies. Samuel Rascoff, for example, writes that “local and state police
represent an effectively ungoverned arm of the domestic intelligence
apparatus.”50 Matthew Waxman argues that local intelligence programs need
to be regulated better.51 Benjamin S. Mishkin writes that “local formal
oversight mechanisms are desperately needed” in order to ensure that local
programs are legal and trusted by the public.52
Fusion centers in particular have been controversial. Critics have seen
fusion centers as an example of the trend toward militarization of policing,53
and argue that they present too great a potential for violating civil liberties,
especially because they are subject to insufficient oversight.54 Several fusion
centers and law enforcement agencies have been criticized for monitoring
Muslims based on their political and religious activity, rather than because of
any indication of links to terrorism.55
In addition, local agencies are seen as lacking the analytical capacity,
financial support, and trained personnel required to conduct effective
intelligence work.56 Riley et al. found “it is striking how limited the analytic
capacity is at the local level. Only the very largest police departments have
any at all.”57 One of the best-known analytical products published by a local
intelligence organization was a report from the NYPD intelligence division,
entitled Radicalization in the West.58 The report has been widely cited, but
also widely criticized, including by Patel, who argues the theory of
radicalization put forward in the report is “unduly reductionist” and
“contrary to research conducted by governments, social scientists, and
psychologists.”59
The strongest criticisms of local intelligence efforts often come from civil
liberties advocates and others worried about the impact of surveillance on
personal freedoms. 60 Critics argue, for example, that facial recognition
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systems such as Amazon’s Rekognition software disproportionately
misidentify blacks and other minorities, and can be used to track protesters
and others who have not committed crimes.61 And civil liberties advocates
are often critical of fusion centers, arguing, as Anthony B. Newkirk does,
that “fusion centers, decentralized intelligence-gathering activities mainly run
by state and local police departments with federal and corporate support, are
byproducts of the privatization of state surveillance and means of assault on
civil liberties.”62
Local Intelligence Program Advantages
Despite these criticisms, there are many possible reasons why local
intelligence programs might be preferable to national-level efforts. On the
broadest scale, local programs can be seen as having the same advantages
any state or local government effort might under a system of federalism.
Local governments provide a check on federal power and help ensure
government is responsive to local preferences and sensitivities. And because
local governments are able to tailor their policies to suit local conditions, they
may be more flexible and more able to support policy innovation and
experimentation.63
These arguments for the advantages of a system of federalism are
frequently made about American law enforcement, which is famously
decentralized. According to Matthew Waxman, “Police scholars generally
regard the U.S. system as the most fragmented in the industrialized world.”64
Such fragmentation is usually considered a good thing. Proponents of
criminal justice federalism believe law enforcement agencies are more
accountable and more responsive to citizen needs when they are locally
financed and controlled.65
Because many domestic intelligence programs are focused on
counterterrorism, however, some scholars believe it would be
counterproductive to shift intelligence functions to state and local
governments. As Laura K. Donohue and Juliette Kayyem have argued,
terrorism often involves issues relating to national security and foreign
affairs, areas in which federal law has typically had preeminence over state
and local law.66 Frank Foley writes that the decentralized nature of power in
the American federal system has led to significant challenges for
counterterrorism, as too many agencies and unclear jurisdictional boundaries
make it difficult for agencies to coordinate effectively.67 And David Thacher
suggests that “there is often a geographic mismatch between the costs and
benefits of anti-terrorism activities.”68 Because terrorism is a national
problem, and few cities face a significant terrorist threat on a day to day
basis, cities that expand their surveillance programs are likely to gain few
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direct benefits. Any terrorist attacks that might be prevented would in all
likelihood have taken place somewhere else.69
But still, many experts argue that local intelligence programs have a
comparative advantage over federal, stemming largely from the fact that they
know their communities better. This results in what Samuel Rascoff terms
epistemic federalism, through which “local agencies ‘see’ the local factors of
terrorism more clearly than national agencies that view the world through the
prism of global trends.”70 Jason B. Jones agrees, writing that “state and local
agencies have significant inherent advantages that enhance the effectiveness
of intelligence operations relating to both homegrown terrorism and
counterradicalization.”71
Another potential benefit from the localization of intelligence is that
bringing part of the intelligence function closer to the people can help make
the public more aware of, and possibly more comfortable with, what is
typically a very secretive and little-understood function of government.
Intelligence has traditionally meant spooky three-letter agencies that most
citizens know little about, and as Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. points out, “it is this
concentration of executive agency authority and power in the application of
intelligence collection methods and technologies that gives civil libertarians
fits.”72 Recently the American Intelligence Community has attempted to
increase its transparency in an effort to encourage public understanding of,
and trust in, intelligence.73 State and local intelligence efforts, which rely
more on open-source information than on highly classified national security
intelligence, tend to be more open and transparent than national-level
agencies and can help make the world of intelligence a little more familiar to
ordinary citizens.
Finally, one of the most important advantages for local agencies is that
they are able to adjust and calibrate their programs to suit local
requirements, in a way that federal agencies cannot. As Matt A. Mayer puts
it, “One-size-fits-all usually fits few well.”74 Counterterrorism programs that
are effective and have public support in New York City, for example, may
not be appropriate for Los Angeles, and under the American system of law
enforcement, Los Angeles is free to develop its own.
In sum, local intelligence efforts may provide two major advantages over
federal government efforts. First, because local authorities are likely to
understand their communities best, they may have a comparative advantage
in identifying sources of intelligence and working with community members
to address local problems. For that reason, they may be more effective in
counterterrorism and other functions. And second, because they are likely to
be better understood than national agencies, and more able to calibrate their
efforts to meet community requirements and preferences, local programs are
more likely to be acceptable to the people they serve.
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Testing the Comparative Advantages of Local Intelligence
The previous section identified two advantages that local intelligence
programs should have over federal-level efforts: they may be more effective in
preventing domestic terrorism and other crimes, and they may be more
acceptable to the populations they serve. In a democracy, these advantages
are equally important. An effective counterterrorism program that disregards
public sentiments (such as by violating civil liberties) would be unacceptable,
while a popular program that failed to prevent attacks would eventually need
to be discarded as ineffective and wasteful.
It should be noted that although these advantages may seem logical and
even little more than common sense—who would not want intelligence
programs that are effective and acceptable?—these are not criteria that are
typically used in evaluating foreign intelligence operations. One might
assume that decisions about foreign intelligence operations would be made
based on their effectiveness, but that is not necessarily the case. In many
situations it is not possible to know how successful a particular intelligence
program will be until it is begun, and many active intelligence operations
and programs may be considered valuable even though they only rarely
produce what might be considered successes. Traditional intelligence efforts
can be considered akin to fire alarms, which are worthwhile for the security
they provide even if they never sound an alarm. And questions about
acceptability by the public, or concerns about civil liberties, do not usually
even enter into the discussion about foreign intelligence operations unless
they involve Americans overseas.
For domestic intelligence, however, the factors of effectiveness and
acceptability do play a role, and there is ample anecdotal evidence that
local programs do, in fact, offer these advantages. Concerning effectiveness,
several studies have found that local law enforcement and counterterrorism
efforts are more successful in preventing domestic terrorism than national-
level programs, such as those run by the National Security Agency (NSA).
New America Foundation researchers, for example, analyzed 225
individuals who had been recruited or inspired by al-Qaeda and found that
“traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from
local communities, and targeted intelligence operations provided the initial
impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of
NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal.”75 And I
have argued elsewhere that local authorities are better equipped to collect
the “little data”—the precise intelligence—that is needed to prevent
terrorist attacks.76
The second factor, that local programs are calibrated to meet local
preferences and thus are more likely to be acceptable, has been often seen in
the area of counterterrorism policy since the 9/11 attacks. For example,
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Portland, Oregon, in 2005, removed its law enforcement agencies from the
Joint Terrorism Task Force, which is led by the FBI.77 Then, in 2011, after a
terrorism plot in Portland was revealed, city officials chose to rejoin the
JTTF, but with an agreement that made clear the importance of protecting
civil rights.78 And most recently, the city council voted in February 2019 to
again withdraw.79 The merits of either action—to pull out of the JTTF, or to
rejoin it—can be debated, but the point is that local jurisdictions have the
ability to make such decisions in accordance with community preferences
and standards.
The rest of this section attempts to test these two comparative advantages
in a more systematic way, by examining two of the most significant local
intelligence efforts in the United States today: fusion centers and domain
awareness programs.
State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers
Intelligence fusion centers can be considered a key test of the argument that
local intelligence efforts offer advantages over federal approaches in the areas
of domestic counterterrorism and homeland security. This is not only because
fusion centers are a central part of the American domestic intelligence effort;
they are also important for this argument because they play a vital role in
connecting the different levels of American government, combining federal
support and guidance with local resources and leadership. As one student of
fusion centers puts it, “Fusion centers matter because they stand squarely at
the crossroads of federal, state, law enforcement, and intelligence
concerns.”80 Being at that crossroads has presented significant challenges
from a federalism perspective, such as how to balance the needs and
autonomy of state and local authorities with the responsibility of the federal
government to enforce federal laws and to provide financial support and
guidance to local entities.81 But despite the criticisms of fusion centers noted
earlier, they do appear to be effective, and they offer a flexible tool of
government that can be calibrated to meet local needs and thus is more likely
to be acceptable to the public.
Relatively little work has been done to assess the contribution of fusion
centers to counterterrorism. David L. Carter and Jeremy G. Carter wrote in
2009, “For the most part, fusion centers are so new that there has been no
empirical assessment of their effectiveness.”82 Carl J. Jensen III, James L.
Regens, and Natalie Griffin argued in 2013 that “the evidence documenting
the utility of fusion centers is mixed at best.”83 Two contrasting
Congressional reports in 2012 and 2013 showed how mixed the evidence can
be. A report from the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
committee in 2012 found that “fusion centers often produced irrelevant,
useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced
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no intelligence reporting whatsoever.”84 But, less than a year later, a report
from the House Committee on Homeland Security painted a much more
positive picture, called the national fusion center network “a national asset”
that was growing in value.85 Even this more favorable report, however,
argued that better metrics were needed to judge the effectiveness of fusion
centers, because metrics to that point had “primarily focused on measuring
capacity and capability rather than ‘bang for the buck.’”86
Scholars have made similar arguments about the need to find better ways
to measure the effectiveness of fusion centers. Priscilla M. Regan and Torin
Monahan, for example, write that government efforts to measure fusion
center performance have “been focused on management capabilities rather
than outcomes.”87 They point out that it is particularly difficult to measure
performance in counterterrorism, which is a world of high impact, low
frequency events, and where evidence of success may require evidence of an
avoided attack—a negative event.88
The DHS does attempt to measure fusion center performance by
conducting an annual fusion center assessment, rating fusion centers against
performance measures such as the percentage of intelligence reports
submitted that address a specific intelligence need, and the percentage of key
fusion center customers who reported being satisfied with the reports they
received.89 The Government Accountability Office notes that these ratings
“represent fusion centers’ progress in establishing designated baseline
capabilities—such as implementing specified policies and procedures—but the
scores may not reflect improvements in overall performance or homeland
security contributions.”90
Although much of the criticism of fusion centers focuses on civil liberties
issues, some critics have argued that fusion centers are ineffective in their
main function of counterterrorism. Monahan and Palmer argue that fusion
centers “are largely ineffective at ‘fusing’ data in a way that demonstrably
increases security.”91 Taylor and Russell write that “there is a noticeable
absence of information as to their effectiveness,” but they add that if fusion
centers were to shift their focus from counterterrorism to crime, they “can
certainly be beneficial and can be valuable resources in combating crime in
local jurisdictions.”92
Some work has been done to measure fusion center effectiveness through
surveys and interviews with their stakeholders. These studies have mostly
found that customers and stakeholders tend to see fusion centers as effective,
but not resoundingly so. Lewandowski and Carter, for example, surveyed
end-users of a state fusion center, and found that “the intelligence product is
read daily and perceived to be moderately useful by recipients.”93 Cooney,
Rojek, and Kaminski surveyed law enforcement personnel in South Carolina
about the state fusion center, and found the center “is achieving a fair degree
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of support.”94 Renee Graphia Joyal surveyed personnel at four fusion centers
and found that, while the centers were effective in improving information
sharing and communication among different agencies and different levels of
government, they were not yet successful in “achieving a robust analytical
function.”95 And Andrew Coffey studied a larger sample of fusion centers,
finding “at least some fusion centers appear to be providing valuable
products and services within their jurisdictions.”96 Carter and Chermak, who
surveyed attendees as the National Fusion Center Conference, suggest that
part of the reason for this lukewarm support is what might be called the
“CSI effect,” whereby customers of fusion centers may have developed
unrealistic expectations from popular culture about what to expect from an
intelligence center.97
Although more work in this area is needed, specific examples of fusion
center effectiveness in counterterrorism are available. Fusion centers have
been valuable in preventing terrorist attacks, perhaps most notably in 2009,
when the Colorado fusion center coordinated with federal authorities to stop
a planned attack by Najibullah Zazi on the New York City subway system.98
More often, fusion centers have assisted law enforcement in investigating and
responding after attacks have happened. For example, the Boston Regional
Intelligence Center was named the National Fusion Center of the Year in
2013 for its work in response to the Boston Marathon bombings,99 and the
Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center provided intelligence to the
Milwaukee Police Department and FBI in response to a mass shooting at a
Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.100
Fusion centers have also been useful in assisting local law enforcement
with criminal cases beyond terrorism. The New Jersey Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (ROIC), for example, has assisted a number of New
Jersey police departments, and in one case worked with the Perth Amboy
police department, the NYPD, the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration on a case that led to the arrest of
a major drug dealer.101 Some fusion centers have begun to focus on human
trafficking, and others have assisted police in sharing and analyzing
information about school violence.102 Lewandowski and Guidetti write that
“[t]he fusion centers of today are not what they looked like when they were
first conceptualized. Instead, they have adapted and have tried to fulfill the
analytical needs of the federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement
agencies in their area of responsibility.”103
Fusion centers have also proved valuable to their communities in other
ways, such as when the New Jersey ROIC served as a state command center
during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. As the center’s director later wrote, “The
ROIC’s Intelligence and Analysis Unit (IAU), which usually produces
homeland and hometown security intelligence assessments, shifted its
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attention to informing local and state police officials in New Jersey’s most
devastated shoreline communities about looting, contractor fraud, and other
potential consumer rip-offs and schemes.”104 In another example of a fusion
center providing what might be considered nontraditional support, the
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) in San Francisco
supported fire crews and other emergency responders after a gas pipeline
explosion caused a huge fire in San Bruno, California, in 2010. In addition to
providing other assistance, the NCRIC supported the San Mateo County
Office of Emergency Services by requesting communications support from
Cisco, which provided a mobile communications center, called a Network
Emergency Response Vehicle.105 Cisco later received a Red Cross award for
its support to San Bruno and other disasters.106
It should be acknowledged that, in the absence of a comprehensive study
and the development of more rigorous measurement tools, the evidence
supporting fusion centers’ effectiveness is somewhat anecdotal. But the
evidence appears even stronger in support of the second part of the
argument: that fusion centers are more readily adapted and calibrated to
meet local preferences, and thus they are more likely to be acceptable to their
communities. In particular, fusion centers have been successful in allowing
state and local governments to adapt their missions to suit local needs. This is
in keeping with the sentiment of the first Homeland Security Strategy after 9/
11, which stated that “our traditions of federalism and limited government
require that organizations outside the federal government take the lead in
many of these efforts.”107 One example of this adaptability is that many
fusion centers have broadened their mission beyond the original focus on
terrorism to take on an all-hazards approach. As Thomas Fries writes,
“whereas counterterrorism carries with it deep-seated national implications,
embracing an all-hazards approach affirms a more state-centric
undertaking.”108
Beyond broadening their approach to encompass all hazards, fusion
centers have, as Waxman describes, “taken a variety of forms in different
states based on local assessment of needs and policy priorities.”109 A DHS
privacy impact assessment stated that “[no] two fusion centers define or carry
out their missions in exactly the same way or are subject to the same
authorities or regulations. Notions of comity and federalism, moreover,
prohibit the Department from placing certain requirements on fusion
centers.”110 State and local fusion centers tend to vary so much from state to
state, in fact, that a common joke about them is that “[w]hen you have seen
one fusion center—you have seen one fusion center.”111 This joke is usually
intended as a criticism, and a RAND study of domestic intelligence saw the
uniqueness of fusion centers as a problem, as it encourages a view from the
federal government level that they have uneven performance and little to
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offer.112 But, from the point of view of federalism and the need to allow each
fusion center to be responsive to local needs and laws, it is probably good
that there is no single model of a fusion center that applies everywhere. As
Lewandowski, Rojek, and Manjarrez write, “The needs of a state such as
Texas or Arizona, which have the duty to police an international border, are
different from those of Colorado, a land-locked state, or New York or
Washington, DC which house many critical infrastructures that are seen as
potential targets of terrorist groups.”113
Domain Awareness Systems
Little research has been done to examine the benefits of local domain
awareness systems, and more work is needed into ways to balance gains from
increased security against any impact on civil liberties. But there does appear
to be sufficient evidence to suggest that these systems are effective in
combating terrorism and crime.
Some of this evidence comes from assessments of cities and states that have
adopted what might be considered full-fledged domain awareness systems,
which merge multiple sources of information into coordinated databases and
systems. The NYPD Domain Awareness System, for example, may be the
most extensive such system in the United States, integrating private and
government-owned security cameras, LPRs, 911 calls, audio gunshot
detectors, and other sensors. NYPD officials credit the system for leading to
faster police responses to calls for service, allowing more efficient use of
personnel through predictive policing, and contributing to significant
reductions in crime in New York City.114 The City of Chicago has developed
a data analysis system called WindyGrid, which puts information including
911 and 311 calls, geospatial information, and public tweets into an
application available to city personnel. Chicago officials have used the system
to maintain situational awareness and support emergency management
during major events such as the 2012 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
summit and annual events such as parades and community festivals.115 More
recently, although Chicago continues to suffer from one of the highest murder
rates in the country, authorities say they have seen violent crime drop in areas
of the city where surveillance cameras have been combined with ShotSpotter
technology that detects gunshots and immediately alerts police.116
Other evidence for the effectiveness of domain awareness systems comes
from studies about the utility of the individual components of such systems.
Surveillance cameras, for example, are controversial, and critics argue the
systems are of little help in preventing crime or reducing terrorism.117 But the
use of closed-circuit television systems has grown considerably in the United
States (as well as around the world) since 9/11, and such systems have been
shown to be useful in investigating crimes and attacks that have occurred.
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Camera surveillance systems, for example, have assisted in the arrest of
terrorist suspects, including the Boston Marathon bombers and a man who
attempted to detonate a bomb in Times Square.118 And, more recently, New
York City surveillance cameras helped locate Ahmad Khan Rahimi, who was
later convicted of having attempted to explode several bombs in New York
and New Jersey.119
LPR systems also appear to be an effective tool for local intelligence, as
many communities have been using them with success in law enforcement.120
Nonetheless, they remain controversial, because they record every license
plate read, whether or not the plate is associated with a crime; some agencies
state that they discard any information that is not related to a stolen car or
other criminal activity, but the systems typically retain their information in a
database for later use. Civil liberties advocates have called for clearer
guidance on how long license plate data can be stored, and some
communities have moved to ban the use of LPRs.121
Some domain awareness programs have been more positively received by
their communities from the beginning. One example is “Virtual Alabama,” a
customized database built by Google for the Alabama Department of
Homeland Security that collects information from traffic cameras, private
and public video systems, land ownership records, and other sources.122 The
system has helped speed up disaster and emergency response times, and in
2009 it allowed state officials to track and share information on a shooting
spree that killed ten people.123 Another is Camden, New Jersey, which has
historically suffered from high crime rates. Several years ago the city
completely revamped its law enforcement structure, replacing the old police
force with a new one run by the county, and establishing a network of
cameras and microphones feeding into a new Real Time Tactical Operation
Intelligence Center.124 Camden has since been called “surveillance city”—and
the term is not always intended to be negative.125
As with fusion centers, domain awareness systems and other programs to
connect widespread surveillance data are often calibrated to meet local
norms. The city of Oakland, California, for example, debated for several
years the establishment of a “Domain Awareness Center,” which would pull
together information from surveillance and traffic cameras, gunshot
detectors, and other sources from around the city. But in 2014 the city
responded to public criticism by scaling back initial plans.126
Even when a community adopts a domain awareness system or other
surveillance technology, there is likely to be more public discussion and
citizen involvement than there would be if the system were used by a federal
agency. The city of Bellingham, Washington, for example, decided to buy
predictive policing software, despite protests by community members who
argued the system could lead to racial profiling. But the decision was only
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made after a public hearing allowed opponents to express their views—and a
year before, similar protests had persuaded the city’s police department to
decide against buying software from a company called Intrado, which uses
publicly available information to provide police with threat indicators
associated with particular street addresses.127 The Intrado software, called
Beware, generated controversy in 2016 when it was tried by the Fresno,
California, police department. The Fresno City Council eventually rejected a
proposal from the city’s police chief to purchase a five-year contract for the
software.128
CONCLUSION
The localization of intelligence has been a significant development since the 9/
11 attacks, but one that has not been sufficiently understood in the literature
on intelligence and national security. The growth of local intelligence
programs is a significant change for American intelligence, where capabilities
have historically been concentrated at the national level. And it has presented
a challenge to American federalism, as federal, state, and local levels of
government have wrestled with the question of who should control domestic
intelligence efforts. But despite criticisms from civil liberties advocates and
others who worry about an overly aggressive surveillance state, the growth of
these programs appears likely to continue.
The localization of intelligence has been an important corrective to the
general trend since 9/11 of increased federal government power in the areas
of intelligence, counterterrorism, and homeland security. The growth of local
intelligence programs has been a positive development, because such
programs have two important comparative advantages over national-level
efforts in the areas of counterterrorism and homeland security. First, they are
more effective at preventing terrorism and other crimes and providing
security in other ways for the communities they serve. Intelligence fusion
centers and domain awareness systems, in particular, have provided valuable
services, often beyond those for which these organizations were originally
intended. Second, and just as significantly, local intelligence efforts are more
readily adjusted and calibrated to meet local norms and needs. For that
reason, they are more likely to be accepted and even embraced by their
community than are national-level, one-size-fits-all intelligence programs.
Debates about American intelligence usually focus around national-level
agencies and programs, and much of the emphasis on intelligence reform
since 9/11 has been to centralize intelligence programs and authority. But the
increasing localization of intelligence has been an important success story
that deserves to be more widely understood and should be encouraged
to continue.
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